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ABSTRACT: A model for the risk assessment of spent nuclear fuel ponds subject to the risk of flooding
is proposed. The methodology adopted is based on the enhancement of Bayesian Networks approach
with Structural Reliability Methods, in order to overcome the limitations of classic Bayesian Networks
(such as the use of only discrete variables in case of exact inference calculations). The computational
tool developed for the methodology mentioned is briefly described together with the application to a
real-case study. The related results are discussed and compared to those previously obtained by tradi-
tional Bayesian Network analysis. Finally, a brief discussion about the advantages and drawbacks of the
approach adopted is provided.
1. INTRODUCTION
The attention about issues related to nuclear safety
is evidently high, particularly after the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. Whilst most
of these concerns are focused on the vulnerability
of the reactors themselves, less attention has been
paid to the spent fuel ponds which have the poten-
tial to be more vulnerable to failures than the re-
actor containment building. Furthermore, as recog-
nized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, even
if the likelihood of a zirconium fire due to the expo-
sure of spent fuel is generally very low, the conse-
quences of a similar event would be highly signifi-
cantCollins and Hubbard (2001). For these reasons
the study of the vulnerability of such installations
to external events, such as extreme weather condi-
tions, results relevant in view of a more general and
accurate risk assessment of nuclear facilities. This
kind of analysis implies the use of flexible models
able to simulate not only the complexity of the sys-
tem under study but also different scenarios. For
example, assessing the impact of natural hazards
on technological installations, the climate change
effect on extreme weather hazards cannot be ne-
glected. Furthermore, a complete evaluation of the
risk requires models suitable for long-term decision
making support but also for real time risk assess-
ment, in order to lead the decision makers even in
case of imminent danger.
This study proposes a generic model for the quan-
tification of the risk of exposure of the spent nuclear
fuel stored in a fuel pond. The model aims to meet
the requirement of flexibility mentioned before. It
consists of a simple and intuitive framework which
integrates climate change models in order to assess
present and future risks of exposure of spent fuel in
case of flooding of the storing facility. A previous
implementation of the model [Silvia Tolo (2014)],
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based on the use of traditional Bayesian Networks
(BNs), highlighted the potential and limitations of
such an approach in the field of risk assessment of
technological failures triggered by natural hazards.
In light of this, a new methodology (firstly sug-
gested by Straub and Kiureghian (2010)) has been
adopted.
2. METHODOLOGY
This section aims to give an overall idea of the theo-
retical background of the methodology adopted and
to briefly described the computational tool devel-
oped for its application.
2.1. Bayesian Networks
BNs are statistical graphical models which provide
the factorization of the joint probability distribution
associated with an event of interest exploiting in-
formation about the conditional dependencies ex-
isting among the variables. BNs consist of a vari-
able number of nodes, representing the variables of
the problem modelled. The nodes are connected to
X1
X3 X2
Figure 1: Example of an elementary BN
each other by edges (commonly represented as ar-
rows) expressing informal or causal dependencies.
Only nodes among which exists some sort of de-
pendency are linked, whilst those that are not joined
refer to variables that are conditionally independent
of each other. With regards to the BN introduced in
Fig. 1, the node X1 is called the parent of X2 and
X3, which are also referred to as its children. Nodes
that have no parents are defined as roots. Generally,
on the basis of the Bayes’ theorem, the joint proba-
bility modelled by any BN with nodes X1,X2, ...,Xn
can be expressed as:
P(x1...xn) =∏
i
P(xi | pi) (1)
where pi refers to the outcomes assumed by the par-
ents of the node Xi, whose state is represented by xi.
Then, the joint probability associated with the BN
of Fig. 1 is:
P(x1,x2,x3) = P(x1)P(x2|x1)P(x3|x1) (2)
A complete overview of Bayesian networks is pro-
vided by Pearl and Russell (2000).
2.2. Bayesian Networks Enhanced with system re-
liability methods
Exact inference algorithms are robust and well es-
tablished methods for the computation of inference
in BNs. These are restricted to only discrete or
Gaussian nodes, often implying the necessity to dis-
cretize continuous random variables and hence im-
poverishing the quality of the information. The in-
tegration of the BN approach with system reliability
methods allows to avoid this practise. The resulting
strategy is commonly known as Enhanced Bayesian
Networks (EBNs). The role of system reliability
methods is to reduce the initial EBN (including dis-
crete as well as continuous random variables) to a
traditional BN on which is possible to compute ex-
act inference. More in details, each node child of
at least one continuous has to be defined as do-
mains in the outcome space of its parents (deter-
ministic nodes) or by a PMF that is parametrized
by the parent nodes (random nodes). The use of
system reliability methods, not only allows to asso-
ciated to discrete nodes children of continuous con-
ditional probability values (as in traditional BNs)
but also erases the dependency of the node from its
non-discrete parents. Hence, the links among con-
tinuous and discrete nodes can be completely re-
moved, finally allowing the elimination of all con-
tinuous nodes. In light of Eq.1, the joint probability
associated to the reduced network in Fig.2 can be
computed solving the integral in Eq.3:
P(D1,D2) =
∫
C1
p(D1)p(D2|D1,C1) f (C1)dC1
(3)
where p(D1),p(D2|D1,C1) are the probability val-
ues associated to the discrete nodes D1,D2 whilst
f (C1) is the probability density function associated
to the continuous node C1. Considering the Markov
condition, hence the independence of the node D1
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C1 D1
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Figure 2: Example of an elementary EBN and its re-
duced network, where C refers to a continuous whilst
D1 and D2 to a discrete node
from the continuous node C1, the solution of the in-
tegral in Eq.4 is reduced to:
P(D1|D2) =
∫
C1
p(D2|D1,C1) f (C1)dC1 (4)
In light of the initial hypothesis, the state of the
node D2 can be expressed as domain in the outcome
space of the nodes C1 and D2. The integral can be
than expressed as:
P(D1|D2) =
∫
Ωd2D2,d1
f (C1)dC1 (5)
where Ωd2D2,d1 is the domain that defines the event
D2 = d2 in the space of C1 given D1 = d1. The in-
tegral in Eq.5 appears in the form common to struc-
tural reliability problems and can be easily solved
using structural reliability methods. Please refer to
Straub and Kiureghian (2010) for further details.
2.3. Computational tools
The EBN methodology briefly outlined in the pre-
vious section has been implemented in the general
purpose software OpenCossan [Patelli et al. (2012)]
in an object oriented fashion. The computational
tool developed provides the graphical and numeri-
cal implementation of models as well as the reduc-
tion of EBNs to traditional BNs. Two main options
are provided to the user for this procedure: the first
relies on the use of First Order Reliability Method,
providing a less computational expensive analysis
at cost of poorer accuracy, the second is based on
the use of Monte Carlo methods. The computation
of inference in the network it is possible thanks to
the interaction of the tool with the Bayes Toolbox
for Matlab [Murphy et al. (2001)].
3. MODEL
The overall aim of the model is to evaluate the risk
of exposure of the spent fuel stored in a spent fuel
pond of a nuclear facility in light of the impact of
a flooding (Fig.3). For the sake of clarity, the de-
scription of the model proposed below is organized
in three sections, according to the aim of as many
different subsets of the network.
3.1. Natural-technological interaction section
The upper part of the network (Fig.4) aims to
model the direct effects of natural events on the
nuclear facility and its surroundings. Three main
mechanisms of external flooding are considered:
coastal, river and surface water flooding. This
TimeScenario
SeaWaveHeight
WavePeakPeriod
SeaWallInclination
CrestLevel
SeaWaterLevel
ExtremePrecipitationReturnPeriod
ExtremePrecipitation
WaveOvertopping
OutfallCapacity
OutfallFailure
DrainageSystemCapacity
DrainageSystemFailure
LocalSeaDefencesHeight
FloodingSurroundings
GrossStationArea
FloorAreaRatio
FloodBarriersCapacity
DischargeFailure
FloodingStationArea
SeawallLength
HighTideDuration
Figure 4: Section of the network modelling the direct
effects of natural events
section involves nodes either related to weather
conditions (ExtremePrecipitation, SeaWaterLevel,
SeaWavePeriod, SeaWaveHeight) or representing
failures directly triggered by the natural event
(DrainageSystem, FloodingSurroundings, Outfall,
WaveOvertopping). The first category is generally
represented by continuous nodes, which better de-
scribe the aleatory nature of such events. Coastal
flooding is considered in terms of both sea wave
overtopping of coastal defences and tidal flooding.
The first case involves the modelling of the mech-
anism of discharge of sea water inside the station
perimeter due to the action of sea waves overcom-
ing the station protections (involving ExtremeSea-
WaterLevel , SeaWaveHeight and SeaWavePeriod)
[Hedges et al. (1998)]. Tidal flooding is assumed
to affect only the surrounding area (FloodingSur-
roundings). Also the river flooding mechanism can
affect the surroundings and it is mainly represented
in the model by the edge joining the node Extreme-
Precipitation and FloodingSurroundings.
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Figure 3: Overview of the BN model proposed for the risk assessment of spent nuclear fuel ponds subject to the
risk of flooding
Surface water flooding involves the events of fail-
ure of the drainage system (DrainageSystem) due
to exceptionally heavy rainfall (ExtremePrecipita-
tion) and the unavailability of the Outfall due to ex-
treme sea level. The overall combination of these
flooding dynamics can lead to accumulation of wa-
ter within the perimeter of the facility, event repre-
sented by the node FloodingStationArea. The node
TimeScenario allows to run analysis with regards
to a particular time interval of choice. Introducing
evidence in the node, hence selecting the time sce-
nario of interest, it is possible to take into account
the influence of climate change on natural events.
3.2. Internal failure section
The event of exposure of the spent nuclear fuel is
bound by the availability of either cooling systems
or emergency supplies. If both these subsystems
are out of order, the event SpentFuelExposure is as-
sumed to occur (Fig.5). The cooling system is ex-
pected to fail if no electric power, either generated
on site (OnSiteAC) or supplied to the station from
the external grid (OffSiteAC), is available.
The failure of on-site generation can be attributed
to power station outages, planned (e.g. due to re-
fuelling or decommissioning) or unplanned (loss of
grid or unplanned reactor shut-down); the failure of
emergency power supplies (EmergencyPowerSup-
plies), such as emergency diesels, is also a pre-
TimeScenario
SpentFuelExposure
CoolingSystemOnSiteAC
PlannedOutage
EmergencySupplies
UnplannedOutage
OffSiteAC
ExternalPowerGrid
DelayInReaction
NumberEmergencyDiesels
FloodingStationArea
EmergencySuppliesPowerSupplies OnSiteSubstation
EmergencySuppliesHydrantSystem
FloodingSurroundings
Figure 5: Section of the network modelling internal
failures
cursor event of station blackout. If both the out-
age and the failure of emergency diesels occur, no
power generation is available on site. The loss of
power from the external network can occur in the
case of failure of the power grid as well as on-site
electric substations and connections (OnSiteSubsta-
tion). The node EmergencySupplies refers to the
lack of effective actions on the pond in the case
of unavailability of the cooling system. It can be
caused by lack of supplies (loss of reservoirs Reser-
voirs or EmergencyHydrantSystem) or by delay of
actions from the outside (DelayInReaction, e.g. the
intervention of fire tenders) or the occurrence of
HumanError which nullify or prevent the action.
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Figure 6: Layout of the nuclear site with Sizewell B re-
actor building(1), fuel building(2) and dry fuel cask(3).
On the East of the site are located the so called Bent
Hills(4), on the west the Sizewell A Power Station(5).
Figure available from EDF (2014)
3.3. Human Error section
The BN model proposed by Groth and Mosleh
(2011) to quantify the probability of human errors
in case of significant incident at a nuclear power
plant has been integrated in the overall framework.
This part of the network is linked to the rest of the
model through the causal dependency between the
nodes HumanError and EmergencySupplies.
3.4. Case study
The nuclear power plant of Sizewell B (Fig.6) in
East Anglia, UK, operated by EDF Energy, has
been selected as real-world case study for the ap-
plication of the BN model proposed.
According to the flood maps provided by the En-
vironment Agency [Environment Agency (2013)],
the surrounding area is subject to risk of flooding.
Moreover, EDF’s strategic target is to extend the
operational life of the installation postponing the
decomissioning date from 2035 to 2055 [Houlton
(2013)]: it is then of particular interest to evaluate
the impact of climate change on the risks to which
the facility is subject. Unlike British Magnox and
AGR stations [ (Office for Civil Nuclear Security
and Industry)] the management strategy adopted for
Sizewell B revolves long term on site storage un-
der water: the current rate of accumulation and cur-
rent safety restrictions suggest that full capacity of
the on site pond will be reached by 2015. Sizewell
B power plant is built on a plateau at 6.4m Above
Ordnance Datum (AOD) on the coast of East An-
glia in the county of Suffolk. It shares a site of 97
Hectares with Sizewell A station (no longer operat-
ing) which lies on the southern side. The area to the
east of the station consists of a series of sand dunes
which slope down to the sea shore covering a width
of about 100m. These ridges provide a 10m high
sea defence embankment along the east boundary
of the site. The site access road is located at an
elevation of 3.5m AOD. The on-site electric substa-
tion is connected to the external grid at three sep-
arate 400kV points (two at Bramford, one at Nor-
wich and one at Pelham) and provides connection
with the external network for the import and export
of power. Adjacent to the reactor building, the fuel
building accommodates the pond where both new
and used fuel is stored [Fullalove (1995)] under wa-
ter. The fuel assemblies are located in the pool at a
depth of water adequate to guarantee the coverage
of the fuel for 24h in case of total loss of the cooling
system. The availability of AC power on-site binds
the working order of the cooling system in the fuel
facilities. All the building of the nuclear island are
provided with fire doors that can act as flood barri-
ers up to a water depth of 1m [EDF (2012)].
3.4.1. Input and Data Sources
A wide range of data sources has been adopted for
the application of the model to the Sizewell case
study. Three different time scenarios has been con-
Table 1: Characterization of the time scenarios
adopted in the study
Year of reference Station state
Scenario 1 2013 Operational
Scenario 2 2055 Operational
Scenario 3 2099 Closed
sidered: one related to the actualised risk and two
to future hazards, evaluated using frequency and
severity forecasts for extreme events projected in
2055 and 2099 (see Table I).
In order to represent the hazards related to future
scenarios, projections have been adopted for the
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sea water level [Office (2013)] and extreme precip-
itations [Francis (2011)] values, which have been
represented as continuous random variables. The
return period for the sea water level are shown in
Fig.7. All the predictions related to climate change
and adopted in the case study refer to a medium
emissions scenario SRES A1B according to IPCC
classification. Also the wave characteristics (Sea-
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Figure 7: Return period curves for extreme sea water
level
WaveHeight and WavePeriod) are represented by
continuous nodes. The probabilistic models have
been implemented fitting historical data [CEFAS
(2013)] to generalized extreme value distributions
(see Table II and Fig.8) adopting the least squares
approach. A linear correlation factor of -0.29 be-
tween the two variables, represented by the con-
tinuous line in Fig.9, has been considered. In
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Figure 8: Generalized extreme value model of the wave
significant height probability distribution
Table 2: Parameters of generalized extreme value dis-
tributions computed with maximum likelihood estima-
tion
Parameter WaveHeight WavePeriod
Shape Parameter 0.268026 0.00512954
Scale Parameter 0.280391 1.45702
Location Parameter 0.539845 4.62444
the implementation of the overtopping model all
the waves have been considered normally incident
to the seawall and no integration with off-shore
near-shore wave transformation models has been
considered. This simplificative hypothesis and the
resulting strongly conservative approach make the
contribution of climate change totally negligible.
Hence, the effect of climate change on wave con-
dition nodes has been neglected.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Hm0
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
Tp [s]
H
m
0 
[m
]
5
10
15
20
Tp
 [s
]
 
 
Figure 9: Analysis of the correlation between signifi-
cant wave height(Hm0) and peak period(Tp)
Table 3: References for the model input
Event Reference
Power Grid Failure Nack (2005)
Hydrant System Failure TECDOC (1989)
On-site Substation Failure Nack (2005)
Planned Outage EDF (2013)
Unplanned Outage EDF (2013)
Power Supplies Failure Plants (2007)
Human Error (section) Groth and Mosleh (2011)
Dissimilarly from the upper part of the network,
the nodes involved in the remaining sections of the
model are all discrete. The input associated with
such nodes have been deduced either from previous
studies or, more generally, from data available in
literature. Table III shows the references related to
nodes for which probability values have been col-
lected or derived from the available literature. The
state of the remaining events involved in the bottom
part of the network is considered to be directly in-
ferable from the outcomes of their precursor nodes,
according to Section 3.2.
3.4.2. Results
The analysis of the model has required the evalua-
tion of 156 system reliability problems. The over-
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all risk of exposure of the spent fuel grows along
with the three scenarios considered. This trend can
be mainly explained with the analogous growth of
the probability of on-site flooding which, as fore-
seeable on the basis of the climate change projec-
tions, results significantly affected by the expected
intensification of extreme weather events in time.
In spite of this, as shown in Table 4, in none of
the time periods considered the probability of fuel
exposure assumes significant values, remaining be-
low an order of magnitude of 10−10. On the con-
trary, the probability of flooding events in the area
surrounding the station, reaches not negligible val-
ues in particular with reference to the 2099 sce-
nario. It must be pointed out that this estimates
could be strongly affected by the conservative ap-
proach resulting from the hypothesis discussed in
section 3.4.1.
Table 4: Quantification of risks of several events
Event Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3
(Today) (2055) (2099)
On-site Flooding 0 1.11E-16 1.10E-10
Cooling System 1.74E-11 1.74E-11 1.27E-10
Spent Fuel Exposure 2.61E-17 1.09E-16 3.32E-12
Flood Surroundings 6.14E-05 2.57E-04 1.80E-03
Several what-if scenarios have been analysed in
order to estimate the risk of exposure conditional to
failure of different subsystems. As shown in Table
5, the failure of the drainage system and the occur-
rence of human error alone slightly increase the fi-
nal risk of accident. On the contrary, the the failure
of the cooling system significantly rises the prob-
ability of spent fuel exposure which, in this case,
grows up to an order of magnitude of 10−2 in the
2099 scenario. Finally, BNs allow also to easily
take into consideration the combination of simulta-
neous occurrence of more failures events, such as
shown in Table 5 for the failure of drainage system
and the lack of reaction of operators. In this case,
the combination of the two accident scenarios con-
tributes to the overall growth of the risk of spent
fuel exposure more than what previously seen for
the two separate events.
Table 5: Risk of Spent Fuel Exposure
What if...? Scenario1Scenario2Scenario3
(Today) (2055) (2099)
Cooling S. Failed 1.50E-06 6.27E-06 2.61E-02
Drainage S. Failed 1.26E-16 6.15E-16 3.36E-09
Surroundings Flooded 4.25E-13 4.25E-13 1.84E-09
Human Error 1.07E-15 4.48E-15 3.35E-12
Human Error &
Drainage S. Failed 1.74E-11 1.74E-11 1.86E-09
4. CONCLUSIONS
A model for the assessment of the risk of expo-
sure of spent nuclear fuel has been proposed. The
methodology adopted is based on the enhancement
of BNs using structural reliability methods and it
has been implemented in the general purpose soft-
ware OpenCossan. The computational tool ob-
tained allows to take into consideration continuous
random variables not renouncing to the advantages
and robustness of exact inference algorithms, at the
cost of a higher, but still acceptable, computational
cost. Hence, the main advantage is the capability of
adequately represent aleatory uncertainty through
the use of probabilistic models. This is a crucial
aspect for risk analysis involving natural events and
more generally climate modelling variables.
On the other hand, the tool proposed lacks the ca-
pability of representing likewise epistemic uncer-
tainty. Indeed, often lack of data prevents the im-
plementation of suitable probabilistic models: in
this case, the adoption of intervals can be a more
accurate choice for the representation of the infor-
mation available. Furthermore, as pointed out in
section 3.4.2, the current implementation does not
allow to estimate the uncertainty affecting the out-
put.
These limitations can be overcome fully exploiting
the flexibility of the methodology adopted, as well
as the relative computation tool. Reliability meth-
ods able to take into consideration a wider range
of variable representations (e.g. intervals or other
models of imprecise probabilities theory) can be
adopted for the reduction of Enhanced Bayesian
Networks including, hence, not only continuous
and discrete variables. Future research will be ded-
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icated to the integration of these methods with the
traditional BN framework and the implementation
of models for validation purpose.
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